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Japan's Energy Policy in Asia:  
Cooperation, Competition, Territorial Disputes 
by Reinhard Drifte 
(Chair of Japanese Politics, University of Newcastle, UK) 
  
Introduction 
Japan is the fourth largest consumer of primary energy in the world despite its 
economy and banking sector being in deep trouble and its energy consumption in 
decline as a result. Japan's sectorial energy pattern and the geographic provenance of 
its fossil energy will therefore continue to exert a considerable influence on world 
energy markets, and in particular on the increasingly tighter Asian regional energy 
situation. Asia imports around 60 % of its oil from the Middle East, and by 2010 it 
will be the world's largest consumer of primary energy. China became a net oil 
importer in 1993 and imports now 30 % of the oil it consumes, two thirds of which 
comes from the Middle East. Other countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, are 
also expected to become net importers within ten years or so. Thus Asia is fast 
becoming a net importing region for oil. 
China's need for more energy and its inefficient use of environmentally harmful 
energy sources negatively affects its neighbours, including Japan. Since the 1990s, 
China has e.g. expanded the use of its abundant reserves of low-quality brown coal. 
Various aspects of supply sources and transport of Japan's imported fossil energy 
influence more and more the regional security situation not only because of the 
continuing dependence on the Middle East by most Asian energy importers but also 
because of territorial disputes around current and potential future gas and oil 
resources and their transport routes. The terrorist attacks of 11 September this year 
have highlighted the vulnerability of the industrialised world and its dependence on 
socially and economically underdeveloped and volatile regions and countries. In our 
context, the attacks have drawn attention to the volatility of all those Muslim 
countries, ranging from the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia 
which are important either for the production and/or the supply routes of fossil energy 
to Japan. 
This paper addresses the question of how Japan is responding to these challenges at 
national and regional level. Special attention is given to the role of China which bears 
a great influence on Japan's energy security not only because of its growing energy 
needs but also because of territorial conflicts. It concludes that while Japan's 
economic size will guarantee that it will continue to be one of the top primary energy 
consumers in Asia, its commercial and political inflexibility will increasingly 
marginalize Japan as a player in the regional energy competition. 
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The growing dependence of Japan and other Asian countries on Middle Eastern 
oil 
Japan's primary energy consumption in 2000 amounted to 5053 mn toe. For about 80 
percent of its energy supply, the country depends on oil with a share of about 51.4 
percent (coal:18.6 percent, natural gas 13.2 percent, nuclear energy 13.0 percent, 
hydroelectric energy 3.6 percent) . The country's dependence on oil is considerably 
less than it was during the days of oil crises in the 1970s. Yet its relative dependence 
on Middle East oil has grown, accounting today for as much as 86 percent of total oil 
imports. Oil imports from the Middle East accounted for 90.4 percent of the Japan's 
total oil imports in October last year, marking the first time since January 1971 that 
the figure exceeded 90 percent. The share of the United Arab Emirates is 22.9 
percent, Saudi Arabia 21 percent, Iran and Qatar both have 11.2 percent, and Kuwait 
10 percent. The increase of Middle East imports has been due to sharp increases in 
the price of crude oil, with imports of relatively cheap oil from Kuwait increasing by 
more than 80 percent on a year-on-year basis, while Malaysia and other Southeast 
Asian countries slowed oil exports because of increased domestic demand. 70 % of 
confirmed oil reserves are in the Middle East which has only a 5 % share of world 
population. 
This strong dependence on the Middle East puts Japan into competition with the rest 
of Asia, notably with China's increasing energy imports: Asia imports around 60 % of 
its oil from the Middle East. By 2010 China alone will be the world's largest 
consumer of primary energy, having became a net oil importer in 1993. By 2010 
Chinese oil imports could reach 3 million barrels per day, rising close to the current 
Japanese import levels of around 4.5 million barrels per day by 2015. Other current 
oil exporters countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, are also expected to become 
net importers within ten years or so. 
Japan's policy counter-measures 
In order to deal with this growing dependence on and competition for Middle Eastern 
oil, Japan has taken several measures. The most successful step has been 
diversification of its primary energy supply. Japan reduced the share of oil in 
electricity generation from 73 percent in 1973 to 21 percent in 1996. Moreover, due 
to its economic crisis, oil consumption fell from 1999 to 2000 by 1.5 percent to 5,525 
b/d. Coal is still an important primary energy source, but it is almost totally imported, 
the major supplier, in order of importance, being Australia (over 50 percent of total!), 
Canada, US, China, Indonesia, South Africa and Russia. The share of coal in Japan's 
total primary energy supply increased from 12.1 percent in 1970 to 13.7 percent in 
1980 and to 16.0 percent in 1998. The country is a major producer of nuclear energy 
with 53 nuclear power plants totalling 43.6 gigawatts of capacity, with a share of 36 
% in generating electricity (Lithuania and France have over 75 %). But after several 
accidents in recent years and the abandonment of several advanced processes (e.g. 
laser enrichment), the political and economic acceptability of a further expansion of 
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this energy resource along the previous ambitious lines has decreased. The 
government had originally announced the building of an additional 20 nuclear power 
plants, but scaled this back to about 13 after the Tokaimura uranium processing plant 
accident in 1999. Other options pursued are renewable and non-conventional fuels 
but the current economic and budgetary situation will not allow any substantial 
increase. It looks not very likely that Japan will be able to meet its reduction targets 
under the Kyoto Agreement although they were considerably reduced in July 2001 
during COP 6 in Bonn. 
As a result of diversification, Japan has become the largest LNG importer of the 
world, with imports, in order of importance, from Indonesia (start:1977), Malaysia 
(1983), Australia (1989), Brunei (1972), Abu Dhabi (1977), Alaska (1969) and Qatar 
(1997). This shift has also meant a geographic diversification since imports from 
Asia-Pacific countries amounted in 1998 84.2 percent of the total. In 1973, Japan's 
reliance on natural gas for primary energy was only 1.5% which had increased by 
1999 to 11.4%. Despite the economic crisis, consumption of gas increased from 1999 
to 2000 by 2.2 percent to 76,2 bn/cm. Natural gas could be the answer to Japan's 
energy requirement: if all the currently operating and planned gas field projects are 
realized, Asia would even have an oversupply of gas. Moreover, gas would 
significantly reduce environmental problems in Japan, including transboundary air 
pollution from China. But only South Korea has an integrated national gas pipeline 
grid in Asia whereas Japan's power companies rely on short pipelines between power 
stations and the nearest port. Gas from Sakhalin (see further down) will therefore 
only be delivered by LNG tankers, and that only once the necessary investment for 
on-site liquification have been made. The lack of a national grid, the domestic 
banking crisis and a general risk-aversion prevents Japan from making substantial 
investments in the various Central Asian, Russian and Chinese oil and gas pipeline 
projects to diversify its suppliers and to shift more dramatically to gas or oil from 
non-Middle Eastern countries. The gas market situation would only change if the 
state would commit substantial funding to a national pipeline grid and relieve the 
current uncertainty over the future regulatory framework of the industry. 
Another policy to reduce the vulnerability of imported primary energy has been oil 
stockpiling and Japan's coordination with the member states of the International 
Energy Agency. Japan has the highest stockpiles of oil in the Western world: As of 
December 2000, Japan's private sector oil stocks amount to 77 days and state oil 
stocks to 84 days. However, Japan and South Korea are the only countries in Asia 
with a stockpiling policy and the high costs of stockpiling will prevent the developing 
countries of East Asia (particularly in the wake of the Asian economic crisis of 1997) 
from embarking on such a policy in any great scope. 
Diversifying energy sources and stockpiling have been taken up by Japan as part of 
its regional cooperative energy security. Japan helps other Asian countries to switch 
to less polluting energy sources. The main efforts are concentrated on China which 
still relies predominantly on polluting coal which negatively affects Japan through 
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acid deposition. Technical aid is directed towards cleaner coal combustion 
technologies and other energy sources. In its effort to promote clean nuclear energy 
but also to find safe ways to generate nuclear energy and to dispose of nuclear waste 
for itself as well as other regional countries, the private sector in Japan has been 
pushing for a kind of equivalent of EURATOM, referred to variously as ASIATOM 
or PACATOM. Japan is promoting through APEC and other regional organisations 
stockpiling by other Asian countries in order to dampen the effect of a supply crisis 
on Asia. 
Japan's diplomacy has also reflected the country's concern with the security of 
imported primary energy. Since the 1970s Japan has been putting emphasis on 
building relations with the Middle Eastern countries, but the need to secure stable 
energy supplies has also increasingly influenced its policy towards newly emerged 
energy producers in Asia and to the countries along its major tanker sealanes. The 
government talks of building a ‘strategic partnership' with energy producing 
countries. Most recently in January 2001, Foreign Minister Kono visited the Gulf 
States to establish ‘multi-layered relations' with these countries which meant the 
inclusion even of cultural relations. Japan has been very active in its diplomacy with 
Iran and urged the US to be more conciliatory towards its more moderate leaders. 
Japan's active support of the Palestine authority and its administration and other 
substantial financial support related to the Palestine people have also to be interpreted 
in this light. However, it is questionable whether this policy has really added much to 
Japan's energy security because it is politically a marginal player in the Middle East, 
notably in the security field. 
One major approach to secure stable oil supplies has been the acquisition of oil 
drilling concessions by Japanese companies with government funding support. 
Japanese companies have been helped by the state-run Japan National Oil 
Corporation (JNOC) to facilitate joint drilling and production in foreign oil and gas 
fields, but the government plans to abolish the company as part of a major 
rationalization and retrenchment of government activities to reduce the high budget 
deficit. It is yet unclear what is to replace this company. One of the reasons for 
abolishing JNOC has been its high costs and low achievements. After having pursued 
the target of securing 30 percent of its crude oil from fields developed by Japanese 
companies (in 1993 the target was set at 1.2 m bpd), the government gave up this goal 
in 2000 because only about half of the target was ever achieved (650,000 bpd). The 
most recent setbacks were the loss of the oil drilling concession in the Kafji oil field 
in the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait border area by the Japanese government-affiliated 
company Arabian Oil in February 2000. The same may happen to its oil fields in the 
Kuwaiti sector in 2003. In FY 2000, 579,000 b/d of imported crude oil was produced 
by Japanese companies, amounting to 13.2 percent of imports of crude. Japan has 
been slow to adapt to the new regulatory framework in these countries and will have 
to involve itself more in production sharing, service agreements and other joint 
approaches and offsetting contributions (e.g. local infrastructure) to compete with 
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other more flexible foreign companies and to offset its domestic restraints on offering 
weapons and military support. 
Japanese companies with government support are involved in the development of oil 
and gas fields to the North of Sakhalin, and the first oil supplies to Japan started from 
Sakhalin II in June this year. Gas production is to start in 2006. However, Japanese 
involvement has been very low-key and slow which is only partly reflecting the local 
difficulties. 
Japanese private and government-affiliated companies also have only very limited 
stakes in the ongoing exploration and development of oil and gas around the Caspian 
Sea in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and related pipeline systems. In Azerbaijan, 
Japanese companies are involved in three of 20 major field developments, all off-
shore. In international comparison, Japan's FDI in the energy sector in Azerbaijan 
ranks 6th with a share of 3.7 % for the period 1994-1998, followed by Germany with 
1.8 %, and preceded by the US (30.1 %), Turkey (16.1 %), UK (15.8 %), Russia (6.6. 
%) and Norway (6.1 %). Japan is only committed to the ‘Blue Stream' gas pipeline 
under the Black Sea with a loan from the government-owned Japan Cooperation 
Bank and supply of specialized high-pressure pipes from Nippon Steel and 
Sumitomo. In October 1997 the international consortium CentGas was formed for a 
gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan of which 31.5 % 
belonged to Itochu, Inpex, and Hyundai. In was suspended in August 1998 because of 
the civil war in Afghanistan and the opposition of the Taliban. Diplomatic caution 
towards China to avoid further strive over disputed maritime borders and territories 
has led the government to ban Japanese oil and gas prospection in its EEZ in the East 
China Sea whereas China has shown much less compunction and is already 
delivering gas from these fields near and even beyond the joint EEZ border into 
Shanghai. More about this in a moment. 
Oil and gas in the East China Sea and territorial conflicts 
Although Japan has domestically hardly any oil and gas production, the situation 
looks more promising in the East China Sea between Japan (notably Okinawa) and 
China. However, disputes over the East China Sea's maritime border and over the 
ownership of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands for China) have prompted the 
Japanese government not to pursue any exploration although China has become very 
active.  
As a result of the publication of a seismic survey report done under the auspices of 
the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in 1970 which 
mentioned the possibility of huge oil and gas reserves in the area (confirmed by a 
Japanese report in 1969), China laid claim to the Senkaku Islands. From the 
beginning of the 1990s China asserted more strongly its territorial claims not only to 
these islands, but also to a large part of the East China Sea and the South China Sea. 
This raised Japanese security concerns related to the safety of its sea lanes to the 
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Middle East and South East Asia, to the territorial dispute about the Senkaku Islands, 
and to its oil and fishing interests in the East China Sea. This concerns were enhanced 
by the focus of China's force modernization on the navy which is still very 
underdeveloped except for its nuclear component. 
The territorial dispute over the ownership of the Senkaku Islands concerns eight 
uninhabited islands and barren rocks which have a land area of only 6.3 square 
kilometres. The islands are approximately 120 nm northeast of Taiwan, 200 nm east 
of the Chinese mainland, and 200 nm southeast of Okinawa. Due to the improvement 
of relations between China with both Japan and the US since 1971, the territorial 
dispute was soon put to rest for the duration of most of the 1970s and 1980s. It flared 
up again with the promulgation of China's territorial law in 1992 and with the 
increase of Chinese survey ships around the Senkaku Islands in the 1990s. Both 
governments started to take a more assertive stance and incidents were triggered by 
nationalists on the Japanese as well as Chinese side (mainly Chinese from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan). 
In February 1992 the Chinese legislative passed the ‘Law of the People's Republic of 
China on its Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas' that included not only the 
South China Sea, but also the Senkaku Islands. According to reports, it was the PLA 
which insisted over the objections of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
explicitly refer also to the Senkaku Islands. The territorial law raised great concern 
with all maritime neighbours of China and Japan officially protested it. In April of the 
same year, a Chinese navy deputy commander was quoted in the Chinese press as 
saying that it was high time for China to readjust its maritime strategy and to make 
more efforts to recover the oil and gas resources in the South China Sea, thus 
reinforcing the seriousness of Chinese motives and highlighting its energy problems. 
Japan's declaration of an EEZ (a zone of 200 miles or cir. 370 km around its 
territories) around the Senkaku Islands in June 1996 (taking effect on 20 July 1996) 
became another flashpoint for the dispute. Both countries differ on the entitlement of 
the Senkaku Islands to a continental shelf and EEZ. The total area for the EEZ which 
may be claimed from the Senkaku islands is about 20,500 square nautical miles. 
China claims that the islands do not entitle to a continental shelf or EEZ whereas 
Japan asserts the opposite. In June 1996 China and Taiwan protested Japan's 
declaration of a 200 m EEZ around the Senkaku Islands. 
The Senkaku Islands issue is closely linked to the disputed continental shelf in the 
wider area of the East China Sea and one dispute blocks the solution of the other. The 
continental shelf in the East China Sea is 300,000 square kilometres. China claims the 
whole shelf to the Okinawa Trough, including an unspecified portion of the 
Japan/South Korea Joint Development Zone. Japan claims the same shelf to a median 
line between its undisputed territory and that of China. 
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Japan and South Korea had attempted to draft an area of joint development where 
their claims completely overlapped, but China objected to this in 1974. As a result 
Japan deferred ratification of an agreement on the continental shelf demarcation with 
South Korea until June 1977. A solution is made difficult since all East China Sea 
claimants (Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan) cite different principles of 
international law to support their claims. Whereas Japan insists on the principle of an 
equidistant (median) line, China adheres to the natural prolongation theory. Japan, 
South Korea and China declared in 1996 a 200 m Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 
Japan and Korea ratified the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (China 
did so in 1996) but the Convention does not help in all cases since it does not address 
historical claims, and its lack of clear definitions make it difficult to judge how to 
apply its provisions on the EEZ and continental shelf. As Hiramatsu Shigeo states 
there is no other way to clarify the continental shelf than by political negotiation. 
However, in view of the fishing interests and mining interests involved, the stakes for 
Japan are considerable since its land territory is 380,000 square km (61st largest land 
area in the world), but the area of the EEZ amounts to 4.51 million square km (6th 
largest EEZ area). 
The Chinese side has been rather reluctant to engage in negotiations with Japan (but 
also with South Korea) on delimiting the sea borders under the new 1982 United 
Nations Law of the Sea Convention. The main reason is the fundamental difference 
between China and its neighbours on the application of the Law of Sea. This situation 
led to tensions about rising incursions of Chinese vessels into disputed as well as 
undisputed areas of Japan's EEZ. Moreover, in the meantime, China started actively 
to explore and even produce oil and gas in the area adjacent to the median line. 
Hiramatsu Shigeo claims that the Japanese government for its part has also avoided a 
clarification of the territorial issue in order to protect the friendly relationship with 
China. Under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Japan has until 2006 
(10 years after the convention took effect) to submit to the UN scientific research data 
including submarine landform and geology, geomagnetism and gravity in order to 
claim the continental shelf. China is pursuing this research much more actively than 
Japan, including within Japan's EEZ. 
In the absence of an agreed sea border, incursions by Chinese oil exploration-related 
vessels, war ships and ocean research vessels into Japan's claimed EEZ around the 
Senkaku as well as inside Japan's EEZ elsewhere in the East China Sea increased 
since 1995. According to Japan's official interpretation of the UN Convention on the 
Law of Sea, foreign research vessels can enter the EEZ of another country, but they 
have to ask for permission. Chinese ships refuse to do so, claiming that either the sea 
area is Chinese territory or belongs to China's EEZ, or that the ship is engaged in 
legal activities. The Chinese government thus used the absence of an agreed naval 
border to refute Japan's protests about the incursion of Chinese ships into Japan's EEZ 
and territorial waters. 
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Apart from fishing and military interests, it is China's developing off-shore oil 
industry which accounts for a growing number of research vessel incursions. The 
simultaneous sharp rise of naval vessels has also been attributed to patrolling of the 
vicinity of these Chinese oil facilities. 
Probably in order to win time and circumvent the fundamental issue while still trying 
to benefit from Japan's technology, China proposed in 1978, 1990 and 1996 joint 
exploration of the continental shelf, but Japan demanded first a settlement of the sea 
border delimitation. There is information that the Japanese government proposed to 
China in 1980 joint exploration as long as it would not prejudice territorial claims. In 
the specific case of the Senkaku Islands, Deputy Premier Yao Yilin proposed in 
October 1980 joint oil development around the islands which could include also the 
US. In the same year Japanese-Chinese negotiations on joint development of the area, 
including the area around the islands, foundered after a series of meetings. In October 
1990, China suggested ‘joint development' of the islands but the report is not clear 
what exactly was meant.. 
But not only is Japan today refusing joint exploration as a solution to the conflict, but 
one can also assume that China has no longer any urgent technological need to rely 
on any kind of foreign involvement. China has been drilling for oil and gas in the 
East China Sea since the beginning of the 1980s and in this way proved its 
willingness to go ahead as well as its technological ability to do so on its own. In 
1995 China launched test drilling in Japan's claimed EEZ about 570 meters away 
from the equidistant line which was met by a protest from the Japanese government. 
Hiramatsu Shigeo therefore warns that it will not be long before China crosses 
Japan's unilaterally established median line. China National Offshore Oil Corp. 
(CNOOC) and Sinopec Star Petroleum Corp. (SSPC) operate several oil fields in the 
East China Sea. In June 2000 CNOOC announced that it wants to discover 600 
billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves in the East China Sea between 2001-2005. 
SSPC announced at the same time that it wants to spend $2.9 billion in the East China 
Sea on oil and gas production and having by 2010 over 90 wells. It wants to boost 
proven natural gas reserves in the region from 40-50 billion cubic meters now to 150-
300 billion cubic meters by 2003. It is not clear whether these announcement have 
been followed up since they coincided also with floating these companies at the stock 
market. But they certainly reflected a continued strong Chinese interest in the oil and 
gas reserves of the area. 
The major gas reserves are in the Chunxiao field and in the Xihu depression. The 
Pinghu oil and gas field in the Xihu depression is near the median line, the Chunxiao 
field being even only five km from it. Pinghu is linked by a pipeline to Shanghai 
which started in 2000 to deliver daily 400,000 cubic meters of gas to Shanghai. 
Another pipeline is planned from Chunxiao to the coastal city of Wenzhou. A third 
oil field, Zhaoxing, is also now being developed north of Pingchao. In the past, 
foreign oil companies drilled a total of 14 dry holes in the East China Sea, but today 
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only Chinese companies are involved in the area, except for the small London-based 
Primeline Petroleum Corp. 
In contrast to the Chinese energy activities, the Japanese government has refused to 
give permission for any activities by Japanese energy companies in the East China 
Sea in order to avoid confrontation with China. Four Japanese companies were 
refused licenses in the 1960s. In 1981 Teikoku Oil sank a wildcat well off 
Miyakojima, an island about 120 miles southeast of the Senkaku Islands, but the 
results were not made public. Most of the Chinese fields yield only gas finds. Since 
there is plenty of gas available in Asia, the incentive for Japanese investment is not 
high. 
Hiramatsu Shigeo, however, argues that the Gaimusho has been rather lenient to the 
detriment of Japan's interest. This policy of Japanese restraint to protect Japanese-
Chinese relations seems to go back to at least October 1980 when Japan's MITI 
minister declared that Japan would not develop oil fields around the Senkaku Islands 
if China did not participate. The irony is, however, that Japan's Export-Import Bank 
provided a substantial loan for the pipeline from the Pinghu field to Shanghai, as did 
the ADB where Japan's influence is very strong. 
The South China Sea 
Any conflict between China on the one hand, and claimants and beneficiaries of the 
South China Sea on the other hand would have a negative impact on Japan's security 
environment and make compromise in the East China Sea even more difficult. In 
addition, China's handling of its claims to the South China Sea is an indicator of its 
willingness to use military force. One of the more outspoken Japanese commentators, 
Professor Nishihara Masashi of the Defence Academy addressed this linkage when he 
was quoted as saying that ‘The way they [the Chinese] have behaved in the South 
China Sea may one day be applied to the Senkaku Islands. It's a creeping 
expansionism'. The South China Sea has also been linked to piracy and more recently 
illegal immigration. 
Annually, over 40,000 ships pass through the South China Sea which is considerably 
more than through the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal. Also around 70 per cent of 
Japan's oil imports, mostly from the Middle East, pass through the area. According to 
Austin, in 1994, 1,555 oil tankers used the South China Sea to reach Japan, 39 per 
cent of Japan's total trade and the equivalent of 6 per cent of Japan's total GDP passed 
through the South China Sea. The development of the Chinese navy towards a Blue 
Water navy is therefore of great importance to Japan. However, it has been pointed 
out that the Spratly Islands, in contrast to the also disputed Paracel Islands, do not 
straddle major shipping routes. 
At least six nations (the PRC, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and 
Indonesia) have claims in the Paracel and Spratly Island chains, and outside powers 
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like the US, South Korea, India are concerned as well. The claims are not only 
involving China, but also ASEAN countries among themselves. Japan does not 
support the territorial claims of any particular country. Japan's official position is that 
in the San Francisco Peace Treaty it gave up its title to any of its previously occupied 
islands in the South China Sea but that the Treaty did not stipulate to what country 
the islands should revert. 
China refuses to discuss the South China Sea with Japan because it is opposed to the 
involvement of all non-claimant countries. Tokyo has therefore also not been invited 
to the annual Indonesian-initiated Workshops on the South China Sea conflict. It can 
therefore only call for peaceful resolution of the territorial conflict and urge the 
maintenance of safety of navigation. 
Japan's minor involvement in some energy prospects in disputed areas of the South 
China Sea may have, however, the potential to involve Japan directly in territorial 
disputes. Several Japanese companies are involved in the prospection of oil in the 
South China Sea area which is claimed by China. One exploration is off the 
Vietnamese coast, with Mitsubishi Oil Company (currently, Nisseki-Mitsubishi) and 
Japan National Oil Company which set up Japan Vietnam Petroleum Company in 
order to develop the Rang Dong field. The Company produced around 45,000 barrel 
per day of oil from the field in 1998. Another Japanese venture which could 
potentially run into difficulty with Chinese territorial claims is in the Indonesia-
claimed Natuna field. Eleven Japanese companies (oil companies and trading houses) 
set up a consortium in order to obtain shares (13 per cent) of the Natuna project from 
the Indonesian company Pertamina (at present, Exxon Mobil has 76 per cent and 
Pertamina has 24 per cent). 
Conclusions 
Competition for oil and gas from the same geographic region, i.e. the Middle East, is 
to last, despite various national strategies to reduce this dependence. Such a 
development is likely to increase Japan's competition with other consumers, notably 
with China and other fast growing Asian countries. Japan's efforts to reduce its 
dependence on oil have been in so far successful that it is much more energy efficient 
than other industrialised countries and that it has increased the share of other energy 
sources (nuclear power; LNG), but it has been a failure in terms of increasing 
ownership of foreign energy sources and pipelines. 
Major future challenges for Japan's energy security lie with the increasing 
competition for energy with China which puts further importance on the Middle East, 
as well as territorial disputes around the Senkaku Islands, the EEZ in the East China 
Sea and the South China Sea. It is the combination of these problems which is the 
issue: If it were only for the oil and gas in the East China Sea, the territorial disputes 
between Japan and China would not matter because Japan could get oil and gas from 
other suppliers. In the case of territorial disputes with Japan (but also the SCS) China 
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plays for time because it does not want open confrontation which would deprive it of 
valuable technological and financial help, notably in the energy sector, and drive 
Japan further into the arms of the US and/or prompting Japan to put more emphasis 
on an autonomous military deterrent, but it is under strong domestic pressure not to 
appear soft on Japan and has to maintain its territorial claims, giving rise to 
occasional frictions. Japan, on the other hand, does also not want to abandon its 
territorial claims, but wants to make China a peaceful member of Asia and enhance 
Beijing's energy security for economic as well as security reasons. As a result Japan 
has shown considerable restraint towards China in the energy field (e.g. Tokyo's 
abstention from oil and gas exploration in the East China Sea) and engaged in 
cooperation. Although disputing the maritime border in the East China Sea, Japan has 
supported the funding of the Pinghu-Shanghai gas pipeline near Japan's claimed EEZ.  
Tokyo provides China environment-oriented ODA which includes clean coal 
technology, technology for greater energy efficiency, help with on-shore oil 
exploration, etc. Apart from cultivating good relations with its giant neighbour, such 
cooperation is aimed at reducing energy-related environmental pollution from China 
and at decreasing of China's need to import energy which would help with 
international energy market pressures and security problems. However, given the 
increasing energy competition with China, it will depend on the general security 
situation of Japan whether energy issues will lead to more cooperation or more 
conflict between Japan and China. The hollowing out of Japan's manufacturing 
industry, with production often moving to China, Japan's energy needs will decrease 
while those of China will increase, but the decrease will not be as substantial and /or 
timely as to offset other factors like the credit squeeze in Japan as a consequence of 
Japan's prolonged economic crisis which, together with a general risk aversion and 
political rigidities, prevents Japanese companies and the government to become more 
involved in new energy ventures in Russia and Central Asia. This Japanese failure 
will ultimately not only reduce Tokyo's support for China (and other Asian countries) 
to deal more efficiently with their energy needs, but increasingly risks making Japan 
a less influential player in the international energy field. 
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